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This paper discusses preliminary investigations on the monitorability of contracts for web service
descriptions. There are settings where servers do not guarantee statically whether they satisfy some
specified contract, which forces the client (i.e., the entity interacting with the server) to perform
dynamic checks. This scenario may be viewed as an instance of Runtime Verification, where a
pertinent question is whether contracts can be monitored for adequately at runtime, otherwise stated
as the monitorability of contracts. We consider a simple language of finitary contracts describing
both clients and servers, and develop a formal framework that describes server contract monitoring.
We define monitor properties that potentially contribute towards a comprehensive notion of contract
monitorability and show that our simple contract language satisfies these properties.
1 Introduction
Web services [7, 6] typically consist of two types of computing entities. Servers offer ranges of sequences
of service interactions to clients, which in turn interact with these services and occasionally reach a state
denoting client satisfaction. The service interactions offered by a server typically follow some predefined
structure that may be formalised as a contract [6, 7, 15, 3]. Dually, the service interactions invoked by a
client may also be expressed within the same formalism.
The contract calculus defined in [15, 2, 5] is an abstract formalism equipped with an operational
semantics that provides an implementation-agnostic, high-level description of client-server interactions;
this permits formal reasoning about web services, such as whether a client is compatible with a server or
whether a server is able to satisfy the service interactions requested by the client. Such reasoning may,
for instance, be used by clients for dynamic service discovery, where a client decides to interact with a
server whenever the contract it advertises satisfies the requirements of the client.
Example 1.1. Consider the contract below describing the behaviour of an internet banking server:
login.
(
(valid.(query.0+ transfer.0))⊕ (invalid.0)
)
It states that the server first expects a login service interaction followed by either a valid or invalid
service invocation; the operator ⊕ denotes that the server decides autonomously whether to invoke valid
or invalid in response. If it branches to the latter, it terminates all interactions, denoted by 0. However, if
it internally decides to invoke the service interaction valid, it then offers a choice (denoted by the symbol
+) of service interactions: it either accepts (account balance) query interactions or else (fund) transfer
interactions. A contract describing the behaviour of a possible bank client is given below:
login.
(
(invalid.reason.1)+ (expired.1)+ (valid.query.1)
)
After a login service invocation, this client expects either of three responses: an invalid interaction
prompting another service request that asks for a reason why the login was invalid, a login expired
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invocation or else a valid login interaction that is followed by invoking a query service request. All these
alternative sequences leave the client in a satisfied state, 1. By analysing the resp. contracts, one can
deduce that interactions on the valid service following a client login interaction necessarily lead to a
query interaction, which then leaves the client satisfied. One can also discern that invalid interactions
lead to a deadlock, whereby the client asks for a reason service that is not offered by the server. One can
also note that the expired option offered by the client is never chosen by the server. 
Within this framework, there still remains the question of whether a service behaviour actually ad-
heres to the contract it advertises. In general, static techniques (such as session-based type systems [9],
or state-based model-checking of compliance, must or fair testing inclusion [15, 2, 5]) are used to verify
before deployment whether a server implementation respects the contract that describes it. However,
there are cases where this solution is not applicable. For instance, the client may decide not to trust the
static verifier used by the server. Alternatively, in a dynamic setting where service components are down-
loaded and installed at runtime, pre-deployment checks cannot be made on the server implementation
since some components only become available for inspection at runtime. There are also cases whereby a
server does not come equipped with a formal description at all.
In these circumstances, a client can check that a server respects an advertised (or expected) contract
by analysing the behaviour exhibited by the server at runtime. There are a number of cases where such
a solution is adopted [4, 12], making use of dynamic monitoring, possibly in conjunction with other
verification techniques. This monitoring of systems may be seen as an instance of Runtime Verification
(RV) [13], a lightweight formal verification technique used to check the current execution of a program
by verifying it against some properties. In a typical setup, the monitor observing the running system
raises a flag when a conclusive verdict is reached, denoting that the property being checked for is either
satisfied or violated.
An important question in any RV setup is that of the monitorability of the specification language
considered. Indeed, it is generally the case that not all aspects of a specification can be monitored for
and determined at runtime, as shown in [8, 1, 11] for specification languages such as LTL and the modal
µ-calculus. In this work, we start to investigate the monitorability of contracts which, in turn, sheds light
on the viability and expressiveness of the dynamic contract checking setup discussed above. In contrast
to earlier work on monitorability, we do not rely on an external formal logic for specifying the properties
expected by a server contract, e.g., a satisfaction relation p |= φ where φ would be a formula from a logic
defined over server contract p through the semantic relation |=. Instead, we use the subcontract server
relation q ⊑SRV p defined in [15] as a refinement semantic relation where q is an abstract description of
the expected properties of a server contract p, thus using the contract language itself as a specification
language. Within this setting, we investigate whether our monitoring mechanism is expressive enough to
verify whether a server p indeed refines an abstract description q.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 overviews our contract language and defines
our notion of contract satisfaction. Section 3 introduces our monitoring setup and Section 4 relates
verdicts reached by our monitored computations to the contract satisfactions discussed in Section 2.
Section 5 concludes by discussing related and future work.
2 Servers, Clients and Satisfaction
Figure 1 describes the syntax and semantics of (finite) servers and clients. Let a,b,c,d . . . ∈ NAMES be a
set of names denoting interaction addresses. Let · be a complementation operation on these names where
we refer to the complement of a as a; the operation is an involution, where a = a. The set of actions
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Syntax
p,q ∈ SRV ::= 0 (inaction) | α .p (prefixing)
| p+q (external choice) | p⊕q (internal choice)
r,s ∈ CLI ::= 0 | α .r | r+ s | r⊕ s | 1 (success)
Dynamics
ACT
α .p α−→ p
SELL
p
µ
−→ p′
p+q µ−→ p′
SELR
q µ−→ q′
p+q µ−→ q′
CHOL
p⊕q τ−→ p
CHOR
p⊕q τ−→ q
Interaction
ASYS
p τ−→ q
r‖ p τ−→ r‖q
ASYC r
τ
−→ s
r‖ p τ−→ s‖ p
SYN
r
α
−→ s p α−→ q
r‖ p τ−→ s‖q
Figure 1: Server and Client Syntax and Semantics
α ∈ ACT =
(
NAMES∪{a | a ∈ NAMES}
)
includes all names and their complement. Let τ be a distinct
action not in ACT denoting internal unobservable activity, where we let µ ∈ ACT∪{τ}.
Servers, p,q ∈ SRV, consist of either the terminated server 0, a prefixed server α .p that first engages
in interaction α and then behaves as p, an external choice p+q that can either behave as p or q depending
on the interactions it engages in, or an internal choice p⊕q that autonomously decides to either behave
as p or q. Clients, r,s ∈ CLI, have a similar structure but may also consist of the term 1 denoting contract
fulfilment. The semantics of both servers and clients are given in terms of a Labelled Transition System
(LTS) where the labelled transition relation p µ−→ q is defined as the least relation satisfying the rules
in Figure 1; the definition of the transition relation for clients r µ−→ s is analogous and thus elided.
The definition is standard and follows that of related languages such as CCS [14]. For instance, the
term α .p transitions with (action) label α to the continuation p; if p can engage in an interaction on µ
and transition to p′, then an external choice term involving p, e.g., p+ q may also transition to p′ after
exhibiting action µ ; by contrast, an internal choice involving p, e.g., p⊕ q may transition to p without
exhibiting an external action (τ is used).
Servers and clients may be composed together to form a system, r‖ p, so as to engage in a sequence
of interactions. Interactions are also defined as an LTS over systems, through the rules ASYS, ASYC
and SYN in Figure 1. As is standard, silent transitions by either server or client allow them to transition
autonomously in a system. However, a client transition on an external action must be matched by a
server transition on the (dual) co-action for the transition to occur in the resp. system, denoting client-
server interaction. Computations are sequences of system transitions r0 ‖ p0
τ
−→ . . .
τ
−→ rn ‖ pn, denoted
as r0 ‖ p0 =⇒ rn ‖ pn; the sequence may be potentially empty, n = 0, where no transitions are made,
in which case we have r0 = rn and p0 = pn. A computation r0 ‖ p0 =⇒ rn ‖ pn is maximal whenever
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6 ∃r′, p′ · rn ‖ pn
τ
−→ r′ ‖ p′.
Definition 2.1. A maximal computation, r ‖ p =⇒ s‖q, is successful, whenever the client’s contract is
fulfilled, meaning that s = 1. A service p satisfies a client r, denoted as sat(p,r), when every maximal
computation rooted at r‖ p is successful. 
Example 2.2. The server p = a.0+(b.a.0⊕ c.0) may either transition as p a−→ 0 using rules ACT and
SELL from Figure 1, or silently transition as p τ−→ b.a.0 or p τ−→ c.0 via rules CHOL, CHOR and
SELR from Figure 1. It satisfies the client r = b.1+ c.1, denoted as sat(p,r), because the only maximal
computations possible are the following
r‖ p τ−→ r‖b.a.0 τ−→ 1‖a.0 r‖ p τ−→ r‖c.0 τ−→ 1‖0
both of which are successful. By contrast, server p does not satisfy client b.1, denoted as ¬sat(p,b.1),
nor does it satisfy the clients b.1+b.0+ c.1 and b.c.1+ c.1. In each case, we can show this through the
unsuccessful maximal computations below.
b.1‖ p τ−→ b.1‖c.0 b.1+b.0+ c.1‖ p τ−→ b.1+b.0+ c.1‖b.0 τ−→ 0‖0
b.c.1+ c.1‖ p τ−→ b.c.1+ c.1‖b.0 τ−→ c.1‖0 
The satisfaction predicate sat(−,−) induces a natural preorder amongst servers.
Definition 2.3 (Server Preorder [15]). A server p is a subcontract of server q, denoted as p ⊑SRV q,
whenever, for all clients r, sat(p,r) implies sat(q,r). Dually, q is referred to as a supercontract of p. 
Intuitively, p ⊑SRV q of Definition 2.3 means that we can substitute a server p by a server q, safe in
the knowledge that any client satisfied by p would not be affected.
Example 2.4. Definition 2.3 allows us to establish a number of useful server (in)equations such as
a.0⊕b.0 ⊑SRV a.0 b.a.0+b.c.0 ⊑SRV b.(a.0⊕ c.0) b.(a.0⊕ c.0) ⊑SRV b.a.0+b.c.0
but also justify subtle cases where substituting one server for another might break client satisfaction.
For instance, we have 0 6⊑SRV a.0 because for the client (1⊕1)+a.0 we have sat(0,(1⊕1)+a.0) since
(1⊕1)+a.0‖0 τ−→ 1‖0 is the only maximal computation (which is also successful), but also have
¬sat(a.0,(1⊕1)+a.0) due to the unsuccessful computation (1⊕1)+a.0‖a.0 τ−→ 0‖0. 
3 Monitors and Monitored Computations
Figure 2 describes the monitoring framework used to analyse servers purporting to adhere to some adver-
tised contract. It defines the syntax of these monitors, which follow the general structure used in earlier
works [11, 1] whereby monitors may reach any one of the three verdicts VERD, namely acceptance,
rejection, or the inconclusive verdict. In addition to the basic prefixing patterns used in [11, 10], we here
also use action complementation, α , to denote any action apart from α . As in [11, 10], a monitor is
allowed to branch, m+ n, depending on the actions observed at runtime. We also find it convenient to
express a merge monitor operator that facilitates the composition of monitor specifications, m×n.
The semantics of a monitor is given in terms of the LTS defined by the rules in Figure 2. This is best
viewed as the evolution of a monitor in response to a (finite) execution trace t ∈ ACT∗, consisting of a
sequence of actions α1, . . . ,αn. Verdicts are irrevocable when reached, and do not change upon viewing
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Syntax
v,u ∈ VERD ::= Y (acceptance) | N (rejection)
| end (inconclusive)
θ ∈ PATTERNS ::= α (action) | α (complement)
m,n ∈ MON ::= v (verdict) | θ .m (interaction)
| m+n (choice) | m×n (conjunction)
Dynamics
MVER
v
α
−→ v
MACT
α .m
α
−→ m
MNACT
β 6= α
α .m
β
−→ m
MSELL m
α
−→ m′
m+n
α
−→ m′
MSELR n
α
−→ n′
m+n
α
−→ n′
MCONJ m
α
−→ m′ n
α
−→ n′
m×n
α
−→ m′×n′
Instrumentation
IMON
p α−→ p′ m α−→ m′
m⊳ p α−→ m′ ⊳ p′
ITER
p α−→ p′ m 6 α−→
m⊳ p α−→ end⊳ p′
IASY
p τ−→ p′
m⊳ p τ−→ m⊳ p′
Figure 2: Monitors and Instrumentation
further actions in the trace (rule MVER). Prefixing releases the guarded monitor when the expected
pattern is encountered (rules MACT and MNACT). The rules MSELL and MSELR describe left and right
monitor branching as expected, whereas rule MCONJ describes the synchronous evolution of merged
monitors.
A monitored server contract consists of a server p that is instrumented with a monitor m, denoted as
m ⊳ p. The behaviour of monitored contracts is defined as an LTS through the rules stated in Figure 2,
and relies on the resp. LTSs of the monitor and the server. Rule IMON states that if a server can
transition with action α and the monitor can follow this by transitioning with the same action, then in an
instrumented server they transition in lockstep. However, if the monitor cannot follow such a transition
the instrumentation forces it to terminate with an inconclusive verdict, end, while the process is allowed
to proceed unaffected; see rule ITER. Finally, rule IASY allows a contract to evolve independently
from the monitor when performing silent τ moves (which are unobservable to the monitor). We refer
to a sequence of transitions from a monitored contract as a monitored computation and use the standard
notation m⊳ p t=⇒ m′ ⊳ p′ that abstracts over τ-moves in trace t.
A few comments are in order. First, we highlight the fact that in the operational semantics for
monitored systems of Figure 2, the monitor does not have access to the internal state of the server
generating the trace, and its observations are limited to the execution that the server chooses to exhibit
at runtime. This is meant to model the RV scenarios mentioned in Section 1, where the source of the
executing system cannot be analysed: from the point of view of the runtime monitoring and verification,
the server description is merely used to generate traces. Second, we note that, in a monitored server setup,
any visible behaviour is instigated by the server, relegating the instrumented monitor to a passive role
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that merely follows the server actions. Stated otherwise, the server drives the behaviour in a monitored
system and dictates the execution path that the monitor can analyse at runtime.
In what follows, we explain how monitors work through a series of examples. The exposition focuses
on monitors that produce rejection verdicts, but the discussion can be extended to acceptance verdicts in
a straightforward manner.
Example 3.1. The monitor a.N+a.b.N checks for violations from contracts that are expected to adhere
to (i.e., be supercontracts of) the contract a.b.0. In fact, the monitor reaches a rejection verdict whenever
a contract either emits an action that is not a at runtime, a.N, or else emits an action that is not b
following action a, a.b.N. Consider the server a.c.0; when instrumented with our monitor we can observe
the following monitored computation whereby the monitor reaches a rejection verdict, N.
(
a.N+a.b.N
)
⊳ (a.c.0) a−→ b.N⊳ c.0 c−→ N⊳ 0
By contrast, when the server a.b.0 is instrumented with the monitor, no rejection verdict is reached; in
particular, the final transition below is derived using rule ITER because b.N 6 b−→ .
(
a.N+a.b.N
)
⊳ (a.b.0) a−→ b.N⊳ b.0 b−→ end⊳ 0
We emphasise the fact that monitor termination through rule ITER is crucial to avoid unwanted detec-
tions. Consider a variant of the earlier monitor, a.b.N, which now reports violations whenever it observes
the trace consisting of the action a followed by the action b. When composed with the system a.c.b.0 we
observe the following monitored computation.
a.b.N ⊳ a.c.b.0 a−→ b.N ⊳ c.b.0
c
−→ end⊳ b.0 (**)
b
−→ end⊳ 0
At transition (**), the server can perform an action, c, that the monitor is not able to follow (i.e., it is
not specified how the monitor should behave at that point should it observe action c). Accordingly, the
semantics instructs the monitor to terminate (prematurely) with an inconclusive verdict. There are two
instrumentation alternatives that could have been adopted, both of which are arguably wrong from a
monitoring perspective. The first option would have been to prohibit the server from exhibiting action
c, which goes against the tenet that the monitor should adopt a passive role and not interfere with the
execution of the program it monitors. The second option is arguably even worse: we could have let the
server transition and left the monitor in its present state, i.e., b.N ⊳ c.b.0 c−→ b.N ⊳ b.0, but then this
would have led to an unspecified/erroneous detection at the next transition b.N ⊳ b.0 b−→ N⊳ 0. 
Example 3.2. The server a.b.0⊕ c.b.0 is not a supercontract of a.b.0 according to Definition 2.3. Cru-
cially, however, in an RV setting, monitor detection depends on the runtime behaviour exhibited by the
server. This contrasts with other forms of verification which may be allowed to explore all the execution
paths of a server under scrutiny.1
(
a.N+a.b.N
)
⊳
(
a.b.0⊕ c.b.0
) τ
−→
(
a.N+a.b.N
)
⊳ (a.b.0) a−→ b.N⊳ b.0 b−→ end⊳ 0
(
a.N+a.b.N
)
⊳
(
a.b.0⊕ c.b.0
) τ
−→
(
a.N+a.b.N
)
⊳ (c.b.0) c−→ N⊳ b.0 b−→ N⊳ 0
1In the general case, a pre-deployment verification technique may also analyse infinite paths.
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In the first monitored computation above, the server exhibits the behaviour described by the trace ab=⇒ ,
which prohibits the monitor from detecting any violations. However, the same server exhibits a different
trace
cb
=⇒ in the second monitored computation which permits monitor detection. The rejection verdict is
in fact reached after the first visible transition on action c, and then preserved throughout the remainder
of the computation. 
Example 3.3. We can monitor for violations of the contract a.b.0+ c.0 by composing two submonitors
that monitor for the constituents. Specifically, since the monitor c.N+ c.end checks for violations of
contract c.0 and, the minimally extended monitor a.N+ a.(b.N+b.end) checks for violations of a.b.0
as discussed in Example 3.1, we can construct the composite monitor (a.N+a.(b.N+b.end))× (c.N+
c.end) to monitor for violations of a.b.0+ c.0.
(
(a.N+a.(b.N+b.end))× (c.N+ c.end)
)
⊳ a.b.0+ c.0 a−→ b.N+b.end×N⊳ b.0
b
−→ end×N⊳ 0
(
(a.N+a.(b.N+b.end))× (c.N+ c.end)
)
⊳ a.b.0+ c.0 c−→ N× end⊳ 0
When the composite monitor is instrumented with the contract it is expected to monitor for, we note that
it does not reach a rejection along every (parallel) submonitor.
(
(a.N+a.(b.N+b.end))× (c.N+ c.end)
)
⊳ b.0 b−→ N×N⊳ 0
By contrast, the violating contract above generates a rejection along every submonitor. 
Example 3.3 clearly suggests a definition of monitor rejection.
Definition 3.4 (Rejection). A monitor m is in a rejection state, denoted as rej(m), whenever it is of the
form N× . . .×N. We overload this predicate to denote a server p being rejected by a monitor m, defined
formally as
rej(p,m) def= ∃t, p′ · m⊳ p t=⇒ m′ ⊳ p′ and rej(m′)
Example 3.5. The monitor c.N+ c.end rejects server b.0, rej(b.0,(c.N+ c.end)) as well as server
c.0 + b.0, rej((c.0 + b.0),(c.N+ c.end)) because both may exhibit an execution trace that leads the
monitor to a rejection state. By contrast, c.N+ c.end does not reject server c.0. Recalling monitor
m =
(
(a.N+a.(b.N+b.end))× (c.N+c.end)
) from Example 3.3, we can also state that it rejects server
b.0, rej(b.0,m). 
4 Preliminary results towards Monitorability
Monitorability may be broadly described as the relationship between the properties of a logic specifying
program behaviour and the detection capabilities of a monitoring setup instrumented over such programs.
It is therefore parametric with respect to the logic and monitoring setup considered. In what follows,
we sketch out preliminary investigations that focus on the monitor rejections defined in Section 3, and
attempt to relate them to violations of the server preorder defined in Section 2.
We have already defined enough machinery to be able to state formally two important properties.
Definition 4.1 states that a monitor m soundly monitors for a server contract p if and only if, whenever
it rejects a server q, it is indeed the case that q is not a supercontract of p. In a sense, the dual of this is
Definition 4.2, which states that a monitor m completely monitors for a server contract p if and only if
every q that is not a supercontract of p is rejected by m.
A. Vella and A. Francalanza 61
Definition 4.1 (Rejection Sound). smon(p,m) def= ∀q · rej(q,m) implies p 6⊑SRV q. 
Definition 4.2 (Rejection Complete). cmon(p,m) def= ∀q · p 6⊑SRV q implies rej(q,m). 
We can also extend these monitorability definitions to a specification language of contracts (i.e., a set of
contracts).
Definition 4.3 (Language Rejection Monitorability). A set of contracts C is:
• sound rejection-monitorable iff ∀p ∈ C · ∃m ∈ MON · smon(p,m)
• complete rejection-monitorable iff ∀p ∈ C · ∃m ∈ MON · cmon(p,m)
• rejection-monitorable iff ∀p ∈ C · ∃m ∈ MON · smon(p,m) and cmon(p,m) 
We can readily argue in a formal manner that the contract language SRV of Figure 1 cannot be
rejection-monitorable. Consider as an example a.0+b.0∈ SRV. If this language is rejection-monitorable,
then there must exist a monitor m such that smon(a.0 + b.0,m) and cmon(a.0 + b.0,m). We argue
towards a contradiction. From Section 2 we know that a.0+ b.0 6⊑SRV a.0, and thus, by cmon(a.0+
b.0,m), it must be the case that rej(a.0,m). Now this rejection predicate holds if either m reaches a
rejection state immediately or else reaches rejection after observing action a. In either case, this monitor
would also reject the contract a.0+b.0 as well, which would make the monitor necessarily unsound, i.e.,
¬smon(a.0+b.0,m), since, by the reflexivity property of the preorder, we have a.0+b.0⊑SRV a.0+b.0.
We deem sound rejection to be the minimum correctness requirement to be expected from the con-
tract monitors we consider. Note, however, that the contract language SRV of Figure 1 is trivially sound
rejection-monitorable via the monitor end; this monitor never reaches a rejection state and thus trivially
satisfying rej(p,end) for any p ∈ SRV. However, we argue that this monitor, end, is not very useful.
We attempt to go one step further and define an automated monitor synthesis function that returns a
monitor for every server in the contract language SRV. We argue, at least informally, that these synthe-
sised monitors are, in some sense, useful because they perform a degree of violation detections. Impor-
tantly, however, we show that these synthesised monitors are rejection sound, according to Definition 4.1.
Definition 4.4 (Monitor Synthesis). The function J−K : SRV →MON synthesises a monitor from a server
contract description, and is defined inductively on the structure of this contract as follows:
J0K def= end Jα .pK def= α .N+α .JpK
Jp+qK def= JpK× JqK Jp⊕qK def= JpK× JqK 
A few comments on Definition 4.4 are in order. First, note that a number of the monitors considered
earlier in Section 3 are in fact instances of this translation. For instance, we have
Ja.b.0K = a.N+a.(b.N+b.end) and Ja.b.0+ c.0K = (a.N+a.(b.N+b.end))× (c.N+ c.end)
from Example 3.3. Secondly, note that the monitor synthesis does not attempt to perform any detection
violation for the contract 0. Since 0 is in some sense a bottom element in the preorder, no supercontract
of 0 is allowed to perform any visible action. Thus, in cases where all the actions permissible in SRV
are known up front as a finite set {α1, . . . ,αn}, we can improve the precision of our synthesis through
the alternative definition J0K def= α1.N+ . . .+αn.N for the case where p = 0. Third, note that the syn-
thesis for both internal and external choice constructs coincide which, in a sense, is due to the inherent
discriminating limits of RV. Consider, by way of example, the monitor syntheses below:
Ja.0+b.0K = ((a.N+a.end))× ((b.N+b.end)) = Ja.0⊕b.0K
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The server c.0 is rejected by the monitor ((a.N+a.end))× ((b.N+b.end)) and accordingly it is neither
a supercontract of a.0+ b.0 nor of a.0⊕ b.0. However, the server a.0 is not rejected by the monitor
((a.N+ a.0))× ((b.N+ b.0)); whereas it is correct to do so in the case of monitoring for the internal
choice contract a.0⊕ b.0 because a.0⊕ b.0 ⊑SRV a.0, it leads to lack of precision in the case of the
external choice a.0+b.0 since a.0+b.0 6⊑SRV a.0. In spite of these limitations, we are able to show that
our proposed monitor synthesis is sound.
Theorem 4.5 (Synthesis Soundness). For every server specification p ∈ SRV, every server implementa-
tion q ∈ SRV, and the monitor synthesis function J−K of Definition 4.4:
Whenever rej(q,JpK) then it is necessarily the case that p 6⊑SRV q
Proof. By structural induction on the server specification p.
5 Conclusion
We have presented preliminary investigations relating to the monitorability of contracts, high-level de-
scriptions for web services. We developed a monitoring framework that complements the operational
semantics of server contracts. We then focused on the rejection expressivity of the monitors within this
framework and related it to cases where it is unsafe to replace one server (contract) with another. Within
our simple framework, we were already able to identify limits with respect to monitor detection powers,
and were able to diagnose problems with a proposed automated monitor synthesis procedure. We were
also able to formally prove that, in spite of its limit, the monitor synthesis considered is, in some sense,
correct (Theorem 4.5).
Related and Future Work The language of contracts for web services has been discussed in several
other works prior to ours, such as [2, 5, 15, 7]; although conceptually simple, it has been shown to
be expressive enough to capture the dynamicity of interactions specified by more elaborate contract
descriptions. The server preorder considered in this paper captures the essence of the must preorder,
studied in [3] and the compliance preorder, studied in [15, 7]; in our simplistic case of finite servers
and clients, the two preorders coincide (modulo minor technical details regarding client satisfaction
and computation success). Our notion of monitorability is inspired by that presented in [11], which
relates process satisfaction of a branching-time logic, p |= φ , with detections of monitors synthesised
from formulas in this logic, JφK ⊳ p. The instrumentation relation considered in this paper is in fact an
adaptation to the one used in [11].
For future work, we aim to achieve a more comprehensive study of monitorability than the prelim-
inary one presented in Section 4. In particular, we plan to consider monitor acceptances as a verdict in
addition to rejections, establish stronger results with respect to rejections and consider extended contract
descriptions similar to [3, 7] that include recursion and the potential for infinite computation. This will
lead to different notions of server refinements such as those resulting from compliance and fair test-
ing preorders [5, 15]. It will be interesting to study whether any of the aforementioned server preorder
variants are more monitorable than the others.
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